Name: Mark Hogben
How are Vulgar-Justice and Platonic-Justice Related?
Does this affect the adequacy of Socrates' response to Glaucon's challenge?
Professor: Dr. Robinson
Class: Philosophy 310/3
Date Due: Thursday, March 18, 1991
The challenge of Glaucon in the beginning of Book II, "Do you want truly to convince us that it is better in every way to be just than unjust" is a question that echoes in all our minds as we struggle to find our own morality and justice. The Republic revolved around this important question. Guthrie claims that the title is misleading due to its translation, "for the Latin Res publica means 'The State' or 'On the Just man'". Although most of the work talks about a state, that state is only an extended analogy of the soul. Socrates believes that using the city as an example will better help us to understand how the soul is partitioned. Socrates feels that a city state is easier to dissect and view the individual parts thereby making it easier to show how the parts intertwine.
In this paper I will attempt to critique Sachs' essay "A fallacy in the Republic", and his objections and accusations to Socrates' response to Glaucon's questions. I will attempt to show how Sachs came to believe that there is a fallacy in the Republic, and where I think he makes his misinterpretation. First I will describe the two types of justice, that being Vulgar justice (Socrates' interlocutors justice) and Platonic justice (Socrates' justice). Then I will attempt to see if there really is a fallacy, a lacuna or if there is a connection between Platonic justice and vulgar justice.
A) Vulgar Justice
Sachs, when describing his view of vulgar justice cites the passages. 442d10-443b2,
"We might..... completely confirm.... our own conviction... by applying ..... vulgar tests to it." "What are these?" "For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would more likely so to act than men of a different kind?" "No one would" "And would not he be far removed from sacrilege and theft and betrayal of comrades in private life or of the state in public?... And, moreover, he would not be in any way faithless either in the keeping of his oaths or in other agreements.... Adultery, surely, and neglect of parents and of the due service of the gods would pertain to anyone rather than to such a man.... And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled?"
Sachs believes one can interpret this passage as saying that the vulgar criteria for justice entails not doing the nasty things stated above, such as embezzling, or adultery. The vulgar conception of injustice consists of doing those particular sociably unacceptable acts. In all the replies to Sachs' paper there is general agreement that the above passage defines social interpretation of justice in ancient Greece. It is this conception of justice that all of Socrates interlocutors possess at the beginning of the Republic.
It is important to state that the vulgar tests that Plato performs on his theoretical citizen find that if he is in harmony with the city he will not perform unjust acts. The last line of the above quotation from the Republic states that the cause of his justice is that each of the principals within does it's own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled. I state that it is here that Plato points out an important connection between vulgar and Platonic justice. I interpret Plato as saying vulgar justice is due to, or a result of, Platonic justice, that is his soul must be well ordered in order to be just at all. How should we view the relationship between these two justices? I think from the above passage one can infer that either Plato thought there was a definite causal relationship or that they are both one and the same. Sachs, contrarily, described vulgar justice as something different from Platonic justice and despite the quotation above, holds that they are separate and Socrates has failed to show their connection.
The concept of vulgar justice is shown a little clearer when Glaucon, brings up the story of Gyges' Ring in (359d1-360b). The story is of a shepherd who was thought to be just because he had no choice but to be just. In other words he is just because of circumstance, i.e. laws and police. This interpretation of justice holds true for the opinion of many in modern day society. Gyges found a ring that made him invisible, and with it he proceeded to seduce the queen, kill the king, and take over the kingdom. The common Greek belief, which is probably still popular today, is that any man given the means will become unjust. It is believed that being unjust is in one's favour (getting the girl and kingdom). We are just because we are forced to be.
Weingartner felt that it should be added that in the vulgar conception of justice, the agent or citizen performs such acts due to his character and not to ignorance or stupidity. Although Weingartner makes this claim I find he fails to back it up with Plato's words or a reference to Plato's words. There seems to be no evidence in 442d10-443b2 (the quote on the previous page) that the citizen does not perform adultery due to ignorance. So the cause of his vulgar justice could be found in the fact that each of the principles within him is stupid, and not ordered, which may cause a weakness for Plato's arguments.
B) The Platonic Conception
Although the vulgar interpretation of justice is not perfectly clear, it might be said that it is clearer than the Platonic conception. The complex Platonic conception that Socrates introduces has been interpreted in many ways. Socrates' description of justice was prompted by Glaucon.
Glaucon asks "Do you Socrates, want to appear to have persuaded us, or do you want truly to convince us that it is better in every way to be just than unjust?"
When Socrates accepts the challenge, Glaucon clarifies his question by giving a classification of goods. He looked at goods of three kinds, (1) Goods valued for their own sake, (2) Goods valued for their own sake and their consequences or effects, and (3) Goods valued only for their consequences or effects. Socrates' responds that his definition of justice falls under Glaucon's second type of good, that is goods that are sought both for their own sake and for their effects. Glaucon responds that the general public doesn't see justice as falling under his second category of goods but in the third category, that is "Irksome and to be avoided". Glaucon then states that if justice falls under his second category, how does justice provide a benefit in itself. Glaucon gives a difficult challenge to Socrates' claim and asks him to show how the life of an unjust man who is pictured by the public as a just man, and is treated honourably, and given many privileges, compares to the life of a just man who is thought unjust and is treated as such, in other words shunned, spat upon, imprisoned, tortured, and the like. And in this comparison Socrates must show that the life of the just man is happier.
It is not until Book IV that Plato gives us a definition of a just man.
We have surely not forgotten that the city was just because each of the three classes in it was fulfilling its own task. - I do not think, he said, that we have forgotten that.
We must remember then that each one of us within whom each part is fulfilling its own task will himself be just and do his own work. - We must certainly remember this.
Therefore it is fitting that the reasonable part should rule, it being wise and exercising foresight on behalf of the whole soul, and for the spirited part to obey it and be its ally. - Quite So.
Now if we are to understand Platonic justice we must understand how each of the tripartite functions in a Platonically just man, which Socrates describes in these passages:
These two parts (Rational & Spirited) will also most effectively stand on guard on behalf of the whole soul and the body, the one (Rational) by planning, the other (Spirited) by fighting, (Appetitive) following its leader, and by its courage fulfilling his decisions. - That is so.
It is this part which causes us to call an individual brave, when his spirit preserves in the midst of pain and pleasure his belief in the declarations of reason as to what he should fear and what he should not. - Right
And we shall call him wise because of that small part of himself which ruled in him and made those declarations, which possesses the knowledge of what is beneficial to each part, and of what is to the common advantage of all three - Quite So
Further, shall we not call him moderate because of the friendly and harmonious relations between these same parts, when the rulers and the ruled hold a common belief that reason should rule, and they do not rebel against it? - Moderation, he said, is surely just that, both in the individual and the city.
And he will be just in the way we have often described. -Necessarily.
Now I said has our notion of justice become at all indistinct? Does it appear to be something different from what it was seen to be in the city? - I do not think so.
This large fragment is worth quoting in full because I will be referring to it throughout this paper.
Sachs interpreted the above excerpt from the Republic, as well as 433E2-4, as the criterion for being Platonically just. In other words the Platonically just person had a soul in which no parts of the soul interfered with each other, and that all the parts worked in perfect harmony. The rational must be wise where that rational part makes the decisions and has the knowledge of what is best for the soul. The spirited part must be brave which means the spirited part of the soul will preserve the rule of the rational no matter what the circumstance. The soul must be temperate, in that the appetitive and spirited agree that the rational shall rule. I think it quite clear by the above quote that Plato was not flexible on his completely Platonically just man.
Raphael Demos points out the difference from conventional justice whereby Platonic justice is viewed when he says:
In Book IV, Plato comes up with a different and unconventional definition of justice; it is, so far as I know, unique with Plato among Greek Philosophers and indeed Sachs calls it Platonic justice
C) A Fallacy, a Lacuna, or if there is a Connection.
Sachs believed that Plato committed a fallacy of irrelevance in the Republic, Plato failed to show that the conclusion of the just man being happier than the unjust man follows from his premises. From Book I Socrates sets out to prove that the just man is happier then the unjust man. At this point in the Republic, no one had even heard of the tripartite soul or Platonic justice so it can be assumed that, Socrates was asked to prove that justicevulgar left one happier than if one is unjustvulgar. In Sachs' view if Plato succeeds in proving that the justPlatonic are happier than the unjustPlatonic he must show the connection justicevulgar and justicePlatonic. Sachs argues that if he is to answer the question whether the justvulgar is happier than the unjustvulgar then he must prove two things. (1) He has to "prove that his conception of the justPlatonic man precludes behaviour commonly judged immoral or criminal (vulgar)". (2) And second he must prove that the justvulgar is also justPlatonic. Sachs believes that Plato did not meet these two requirements, nor could he have been successful in meeting them.
What Sachs fails to see, in my opinion backed up by Vlastos and Weingartner, and Hall is that there is an intricate structure or pattern that Plato was unfolding by his analogy of the city-state which should show that there is a connection. Even if a connection is not formed
"there is no textual basis for the fallacy of irrelevancy as understood by Sachs and that the extension of Platonic justice is not as limited in its application to members of the ideal community as he would have us believe."
The first objection is that Plato would have to prove that a Platonically just man would not do vulgarly unjust acts is an objection that would not be made if Sachs understood the premises. In the quote of the Republic (see section of Platonic justice), Plato defines the virtues that the Platonically just man must have to be Platonically just. I think if one were to understand the complexity of the Platonically just man and the characteristics that accompany it one would not pose the question "would the Platonically just man perform vulgarly unjust acts". The definition of the Platonically just man necessitates that he could not perform vulgar or Platonically unjust acts. This can be understood by Plato's definition of the virtues of the soul. When Plato states at 441d-e that each part of the soul must do its own work, that the rational should rule the soul, spirited to follow the rational, and the appetitive to obey the rule of reason. If a soul were to be Platonically just, as stated above in the definition of Platonic justice, the soul must be wise, courageous and self-controlled: Wise, meaning knowing what is best for the soul and how to rule it; courageous, the spirited helps the rational control the appetitive; and temperate, the appetitive agrees to let the rational rule. In the Republic Socrates states "Each one of us within whom each part is fulfilling its own task will himself be just and do his own work" Weingartner states in his attack on Sachs' first objection.
Whatever the reason there may be for supposing that no justPlatonic man is an unjustvulgar man, it cannot be found in the assertion of the relation, but only in the theory of justicePlatonic which Socrates puts forth.
He goes on to say.
Since the Platonically just man also knows what is right, he will neither embezzle, commit sacrilege, steal, nor betray his comrades.
Raphael Demos, interpreted Sachs' article differently than Weingartner. Demos states:
I agree that there is a gap in the argument, but a gap is a lacuna and a lacuna is not a fallacy.
Since Platonic justice involves one's relation to oneself Demos does not see how the relation to people outside ourselves could be related to Platonic justice. Demos agrees that there is a gap, and no proof that the Platonically just could not perform vulgar unjust acts, but that does not necessarily mean it is not true. Therefore Demos believes that there is a gap not a fallacy. To say that one is not sure of a premise does not mean it is false, it is here that Demos claims that Sachs' fallacy transforms to a gap or lacuna.
Demos was not really sure whether Sachs' second objection was necessary to Plato's argument, so he does not discuss Sachs' second objection which must prove that the justvulgar is also justPlatonic. He does however discuss the first objection which is the justPlatonic entails justvulgar. Like Sachs, Demos is not satisfied with Socrates' statement that a man with inner harmony could not betray his friends, etc, and claims that assumption is not clear to him. Once again I am not convinced that the gap exists. Gregory Vlastos responds to the accusation that Plato's precepts are full of gaps by saying "Plato's definiens for 'justice' would fill the gaps", his definiens being that of wisdom, courage, and temperance.
You will remember Sachs' second requirement for Plato, which is Socrates, must prove that the justvulgar is also justPlatonic. Sachs believed that even if Plato passed the first objection, if he does not prove the second, it could logically be possible for the unjustPlatonic man, who is justvulgar who could not be as happy as the unjustvulgar man.
I agree that it is possible to be unjustPlatonic and at the same time to be justvulgar but in that case the vulgar tests ascribed by Plato in 442d10-443b2 as stated from the definition of vulgar justice, the citizen should fail the vulgar tests. If he did not fail, because the citizens' impurities were not visible or the citizen is acting just out of ignorance because he is not a philosopher king, then he would be closer to complete justicePlatonic than would an unjustvulgar man whom it is clear to see is unjust. Therefore, I do not agree that it is possible for a justvulgar man to be not as happy as a unjustvulgar man. The idea Sachs stated above of the possibility of the vulgarly just man not being as happy as the vulgarly unjust man could not be possible under the definitions Platonically just and unjust people. For Plato would still believe that both the vulgarly just man and the vulgarly unjust man have a tripartite soul in a particular order. The vulgarly just man must be closer to the Platonically just man then the vulgarly unjust man.
It may be noted what Weingartner stated that the vulgarly just individual is such that he must not be "vulgarly just merely because his stupidity and clumsiness make him fail in all attempts to perform unjust acts" I again state that Weingartner's above claim has no proof. I might go one step further and state that, even under Plato's criteria for a vulgarly just individual, an innocent or ignorant individual who has not learned injustice but has grown up in a sheltered environment might still pass Plato's vulgar tests for justice. I don't think Plato's explanation for the vulgarly just individual would still be sound if one gives an explanation for the vulgarly just individual by stating that he is just because of ignorance, clumsiness or stupidity. An individual whose soul is in a state of oligarchy could be labelled vulgarly just, and Platonically unjust. Would this person be happier than the Platonically just, under Socrates' definition? I would say of course not, but in the real world I would not be so sure. That would be an attack on Plato's premise not his argument.
Sachs also states that if Plato passed the second objection, namely proving that the justvulgar man is a justPlatonic man, "it would follow that no one is happier than vulgarly just individuals" The only reasoning I can follow that Sachs' statement could be viewed as true, is that the justvulgar man would be happier because he only has to appear as just, but I do not support this reasoning. Once again Sachs fails to see the connection. If one were to be a vulgarly just person, that is viewed as just, one could be two things. One could be a philosopher king, who is both Platonically just and vulgarly just, and therefore no happier than the justPlatonic man or one could be the vulgarly just who is just out of ignorance or that he is not seen to be unjust, in that case, by definition he, would not be Platonically just and less happy. I don't see how it follows that if someone were Platonically just there could be a vulgarly just person who is happier. In Plato's definition that could not be possible, for either they are identical and just as happy, or they are not and of course the Platonically just person will be the happiest having the excellences of the tripartite soul.
If Sachs had posed the question of "How does one know who is happy at all?" or "what is happiness?", although Plato would have an answer thanks to the complex world he has created that would be a powerful question that would strike close to his premises. Although I would love to explore that approach, Sachs chooses to fight Plato in his own world, claiming he makes a fallacy, which questions Plato's reasoning not his premises. The question of happiness would challenge Plato's premise of true happiness, which is only acquired by the philosopher king when he grasps the form of the Good and reasons downward to find the other forms in relation to the form of the Good.
Sachs also claims that although it is stated in the Republic that the justPlatonic could not perform unjustvulgar acts, Socrates fails to prove it. Sachs also states that even under Socrates' definition of a justPlatonic man he is still capable of acts that are unjust but done in a foolish, unintelligent, cowardly, or uncontrolled way
You will notice how he uses the term intelligence instead of the common translation of , he claims in footnote 21,
Because "Wisdom," the orthodox translation of , is the name of something intimately connected with justice and morality as they are ordinarily understood, I suggest, as an alternative, "intelligence"; whatever Plato intended by his employment of toward the end of Book IV, one is not entitled to assume without argument that a man possesses it will be ordinarily just or moral See 433B8
Because of his translation Sachs uses the word intelligence to his benefit. One can be intelligent but not know what is right for the soul but if one is wise it follows that one knows what is good for the soul. Therefore Sachs' misuse of the word intelligence enables him to find a weak spot in Plato's reasoning. Unfortunately it is a weak spot that does not exist. Therefore it nullifies Sachs' objection of a Platonically just man performing vulgar or Platonically unjust acts. Once again, according to Plato's definition, vulgar injustice and Platonic injustice are incompatible with Platonic justice. If one were to be Platonically just our wisdom would safeguard us from making ignorant mistakes causing injustice.
Near the end of Sachs' paper he states.
After Socrates and Glaucon agree that the Platonically just man is the least likely of all men to commit vulgar injustices, Socrates says, "And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled?" (443B1-2). Socrates is here stating that the cause of the Platonically just man's vulgar justice is precisely that he is Platonically just. Perhaps someone might be tempted, on the basis of the remark, to think that Plato was suggesting that Platonic justice is a necessary condition for vulgar justice. There is, however, no warrant for extending the remark in this way.
Sachs' claims that Socrates' meaning in (443B1-2) is not clear. In other words Socrates has no warrant to claim that one must be Platonically just to necessarily be vulgarly just.
I believe that if Sachs were to have taken Socrates literally in (443b1-2), he would have had a better understanding of Plato's definition of justice. If all parts of the soul function properly and each does it own job, then the soul will be Platonically just and by definition all the good actions which a Greek would attribute to being just would be performed by that soul. In the way in which Sachs questions Plato's argument I think he fails for, I think, Plato's premises necessitate his conclusions. It may be possible to question Plato's premises, for example, maybe one might believe that what makes us do just acts is God, and not the arrangement of the tripartite soul, but that is not what Sachs tried to do.
Sachs states that Plato did not prove his first requirement. That is that the justPlatonic is not unjustvulgar, nor did he prove that the justPlatonic is justvulgar. With regards to the latter, Sachs claims Plato could not have proven the second given Plato's definition.
Sachs concludes that Plato's claim that the Platonically just man is the happiest man is irrelevant, because Plato fails to show the relationship between Platonic justice and vulgar justice. Weingartner maintains that it was not Plato's failure to show the relationship that caused Sachs' fallacy, but, "Sachs treating this complex affair in too cursory a manner"
Demos claims that a relationship or logical connection may exist proving that the Platonically just man could not perform unjust acts, as he sets out to prove, but Demos claims if he fails, that does not mean that the relationship does not exist. His argument goes as follows.
1. Platonically just people let the reason rule their soul
2. Reason is the apprehension of the truth and of the good
3. Reason is a desire and an aspiration to the ideal.
4. The good which is the target of reason includes or entails justice.
5. Reason grasps forms, that is good, wisdom, justice
6. eros of good and of beauty leads to accomplishment; that is instantiations of the forms.
7. To aim at the good is also to aim at the production of good things.
8. Therefore, to an individual to aim at justice means that he/she cares not only for justice in the abstract, but also that justice should be embodied in human beings in general.
The above proof, according to Demos' reasoning, may or may not prove that the Platonically just man can not be vulgarly unjust. It is difficult when one steps into the realm of Plato's complex world. I think it would be false to state that in Plato's world which incorporates the vulgar one, the Platonically just individual is vulgarly unjust.
In conclusion I will repeat that I do not agree with the views of Sachs, stating that the fallacy of irrelevance can be attributed to Plato, nor am I sure that a gap exists in Plato's argument. I agree with the conclusions that there appears to be a connection; how that connection is made may be difficult to show. Demos tried to establish the connection in the above eight premises, Vlastos tried to do it in ten premises in "The Argument that 'Justice Pays'", and then tried a second time with seven premises in "Justice and Psychic Harmony in the Republic". Vlastos then states if he has still failed to show Plato's connection and that if a mistake in Plato's logic exists Plato himself could repair the damage without giving up a single of his substantive tenets. I would like to think that Vlastos is correct and the brilliant structure that Plato has constructed may stand the test of time and continue to delight the minds of philosophers.
Endnotes